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public 01:34:43

Johan Brauer : The Stabilisation of Equilibria in Evolutionary Game Dynamics through Mutation

  -   Probability ( 208 Views )

The multi-population replicator dynamics (RD) can be considered a dynamic approach to the study of multi-player games, where it was shown to be related to Cross-learning, as well as of systems of co-evolving populations. However, not all of its equilibria are Nash equilibria (NE) of the underlying game, and neither convergence to an NE nor convergence in general are guaranteed. Although interior equilibria are guaranteed to be NE, no interior equilibrium can be asymptotically stable in the multi-population RD, resulting, e.g., in cyclic orbits around a single interior NE. We report on our investigation of a new notion of equilibria of RD, called mutation limits, which is based on the inclusion of a naturally arising, simple form of mutation, but is invariant under the specific choice of mutation parameters. We prove the existence of such mutation limits for a large range of games, and consider an interesting subclass, that of attracting mutation limits. Attracting mutation limits are approximated by asymptotically stable equilibria of the (mutation-)perturbed RD, and hence, offer an approximate dynamic solution of the underlying game, especially if the original dynamic has no asymptotically stable equilibria. Therefore, the presence of mutation will indeed stabilise the system in certain cases and make attracting mutation limits near-attainable. Furthermore, the relevance of attracting mutation limits as a game theoretic equilibrium concept is emphasised by the relation of (mutation-)perturbed RD to the Q-learning algorithm in the context of multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, in contrast to the guaranteed existence of mutation limits, attracting mutation limits do not exist in all games, raising the question of their characterization.

public 01:24:58

Pascal Maillard : Interval fragmentations with choice

  -   Probability ( 132 Views )

Points fall into the unit interval according to a certain rule, splitting it up into fragments. An example rule is the following: at each step, two points are randomly drawn from the unit interval and the one that falls into the smaller (or larger) interval is discarded, while the other one is kept. This process is inspired by the so-called "power of choice" paradigm originating in the computer science literature on balanced load allocation models. The question of interest is how much the rule affects the geometry of the point cloud. With Elliot Paquette [1] we introduced a general version of this interval fragmentation model and showed that the empirical distribution of rescaled interval lengths converges almost surely to a deterministic probability measure. I will report on this work as well as on work in progress [2] where we show that the empirical measure of the points converges almost surely to the uniform distribution. The proofs involve techniques from stochastic approximation, non-linear integro-differential equations, ergodic theory for Markov processes and perturbations of semigroups on L^p spaces, amongst other things. [1] Maillard, P., & Paquette, E. (2016). Choices and intervals. Israel Journal of Mathematics, 212(1), 337–384. [2] Maillard, P., & Paquette, E. (in preparation). Interval fragmentations with choice: equidistribution and the evolution of tagged fragments

public 01:34:45

Yunjian (John) Jiang : Mixing time of Kac and related walks

  -   Probability ( 120 Views )

public 01:34:49

Martin Hairer : Weak universality of the KPZ equation

  -   Probability ( 116 Views )